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NOTES
Gregorian v. Izvestia: Libel and the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act
As U.S. citizens become more involved with foreign nations, a
consistent approach to settling international disputes becomes in-
creasingly important. Aware of the delicacy and significance of inter-
national relations, a foreign state may seek to take advantage of an
American plaintiff by invoking its privilege of sovereign immunity.
Accordingly, it is imperative that United States courts apply the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in a predictable manner, eradicating im-
position of immunity simply for the sake of smoother international
relations.
Sovereign immunity is governed by the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act (FSIA),1 which allows American citizens a domestic fo-
rum for settling international disputes2 while establishing immunity
for foreign nations subject to specified exceptions. 3 The FSIA pro-
vides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sov-
ereigns whose allegedly unlawful actions fall within one of these
exceptions. One such basis for jurisdiction, known as the commer-
cial activity exception, provides jurisdiction over sovereigns who'
cause a "direct effect" in the United States as a consequence of their
commercial dealings. 4
Defining "direct effect" and determining what types of conduct
between a plaintiff and a foreign state satisfy the definition of "com-
mercial activity" have been sources of confusion for American
courts. Further problems arise with respect to particular tort claims
which appear to be exempt from the commercial exception to immu-
I The FSIA or "Immunities Act," Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1982)), was enacted on Octo-
ber 21, 1976.
2 Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Inimnunities Act and the Due Process
Clause, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 474, 474 (1980).
J 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605 (1982). The statute states:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the states ex-
cept as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of' this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604. The other exceptions are enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
4 Note, supra note 2, at 474.
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nity. In a recent case, Gregorian v. Izvestia,5 the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California held that subject matter jurisdiction
did not exist in a libel action against a foreign state. Do such torts
demand litigation when they arise out of claims involving foreign
states in their commercial capacity? Recent appellate court decisions
fail to dispel this confusion.
Gregorian arose when California International Trade Corpora-
tion (CIT), owned by plaintiff Raphael Gregorian, served as a sales
representative for American manufacturers, exporting medical and
laboratory equipment to the USSR.6 After ten years of work and ac-
creditation by the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR, the CIT
was granted the privilege of an office and personnel in Moscow. The
accreditation of CIT symbolized the prestige and status Gregorian
had attained. All business came to an abrupt halt, however, when the
Soviet Union failed to pay for equipment it procured through V/O
Licensintorg and V/O Medexport, two Soviet trading companies. 7
When Gregorian pressed the trading companies for payment of the
debt, CIT's accreditation status was revoked, precisely one month
short of its expiration date, taking from Gregorian the privilege of
using a Moscow office and Soviet personnel. Eight days later, an arti-
cle attacking Gregorian was printed in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia, 8
accusing Gregorian of "bribery, smuggling, and other unscrupulous
business practices," 9 and implying that he was an U.S. spy.' 0 Plain-
tiffs Gregorian and CIT unsuccessfully tried to settle the matter with
the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR and subsequently filed
suit against defendants Izvestia, V/O Licensintorg, V/O Medexport,
the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the USSR, alleging libel
and breach of contract." l
After being served with the summons and complaint, the
Ministry of the USSR rejected service, claiming a right to sovereign
immunity. 12 Upon plaintiffs' motion for entry of default judg-
ment,. the court determined that plaintiffs' claim was "sufficiently
commercial that it justified an exception to immunity under [section]
1605(a)(2) of the FSIA.' '  A default judgment was enter-
5 658 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
6 658 F. Supp. at 1226.
7 Id.
8 Id. Izvestia is a newspaper published by the "Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR" and distributed worldwide, including the United States. Id.
1) Id.
Io Id. Because the article alleged that Gregorian had engaged in unscrupulous busi-
ness activities, it significantiy hurt Gregorian's business with Soviet manufacturers and
businesses worldwide. The court awarded damages of $163,165.17 on the contract claim
and general damages of $2,500,000 on the libel claim. Id. at 1227.
1 tId. at 1226-27.
12 Id. at 1227. When service of process was made to defendants, they were each ad-
vised of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Id.
13 Id. at 1233.
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ed. 14 In satisfaction of the judgment debt, the U.S. magistrate issued
plaintiffs a writ of execution on two bank accounts, prompting de-
fendants V/O Licensintorg and V/O Medexport to file motions with
the court to vacate the judgment, stay execution, and dismiss the
case.' 5 On February 2, 1987, an order was issued staying execution
on the judgment until the court could decide defendants' motions. 16
Plaintiffs alleged that this libel arose out of a commercial con-
tract claim, and, as the FSIA grants no immunity for commercial dis-
putes, U.S. courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the libel
action.' 7 The court disagreed and, finding its prior decision regard-
ing the libel claim to be lacking for subject matter jurisdiction pursu-
ant to section 1605 of the FSIA, set aside the decision as void and
dismissed the libel claim.18 In granting the defendants absolute sov-
ereign immunity the court relied upon an interpretation of the Im-
munities Act based on legislative intent and international policy.
The Gregorian court began its analysis of the sovereign immuni-
ties issue by considering the essential nature of the defendants' activ-
ity.' 9 Because under the FSIA a grant of immunity depends on
whether the nature of the sovereign's activity was commercial, the
court must examine the act which forms the basis of the suit.20 Fo-
cusing on Izvestia, the court determined that all aspects of a newspa-
per contribute to its characterization as commercial or public, noting
that a government's conduct would not be held public based on its
manifestation in a government-owned newspaper. 2 1 Further, the
court recognized that Congress' goal in distinguishing between the
public and private character of an act was to keep foreign states from
enjoying absolute sovereign immunity. 22 Thus, the court acknowl-
edged the significance of restrictive sovereign immunity.
At this point, the Gregorian court abandoned its quest for distin-
guishing between commercial and public acts and based its analysis
on legislative intent. The court acknowledged the likelihood that the
nature of the Soviet Union's activities was commercial and recog-
nized the possibility of the libel claim arising out of plaintiffs' con-
14 Id. at 1227.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1228.
17 Id at 1231-32. Plaintiffs assert that the Soviet defendants libeled Gregorian in
order to avoid the ensuing contract action against them. Id.
18 Id. at 1234. The court set aside its decision as void pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4). The libel claim was dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Id.
19 Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1232. An activity's commercial character "shall be deter-
mined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act.
rather than by reference to its purpose." Id. at 1232 n.5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)).
20 Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text.
21 Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1232-33.
22 Id. at 1233.
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tract claim, 23 but gave these factors little weight in its analysis. The
court emphasized that an interpretation of the commercial activity
exception as including the immunities listed in subsection (a)(5)(B)2 4
would subject foreign states to jurisdiction in circumstances under
which the United States government enjoys immunity.2 5 This analy-
sis was supported by relying on the legislative history of the Act
which states that the claims found in sections 1605(a)(5)(A) and (B)
"correspond to many of the claims with respect to which the U.S.
Government retains immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act." 26
Because the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA)2 7 bars all libel claims
against the United States government, the court determined that
Congress also meant to grant absolute immunity with respect to libel
to foreign sovereigns. 2 8
The Gregorian court acknowledged a basic difference in the two
Acts, however, which makes its case tenuous. Unlike the FSIA, the
FTCA does not include ambiguous language that connects the im-
munities section of the Act to other provisions which fail to protect
the government from suit. 29 This appears to weaken the connection
between the two Acts. While the court admitted that the FSIA left
room for interpretation, it insisted that it was "unlikely that Con-
gress wished to create a double standard" under which the United
States government is immune from tort claims such as libel, but for-
eign states are exposed to suit.3 0
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has a long history in Ameri-
can courts. The importance of the immunities doctrine was first em-
phasized and introduced into U.S. courts in the nineteenth-century
opinion of Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.3 l Chief Justice Marshall,
23 Id. at 1231. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
24 The other exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity are discussed infra at notes
45-50.
25 Gregor4an, 658 F. Supp. at 1234-35.
26 Id. at 1233 (quoting House Judiciary Comm., Jurisdiction of U'uited States Courts in
Suits Against Foreign States, H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6620).
27 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1982). The FTCA bars recovery against the United
States government for any claim arising out of libel. The statute provides that:
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relat-
ing to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual tinder like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior
to judgment or for punitive damages.
28 U.S.C. § 2674. There are several exceptions to this provision, however, granting the
government immunity for tort claims including:
Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, ma-
licious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, de-
ceit, or interference with contract rights.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
28 Gregorian, 658 F. Stipp. at 1233-34.
29 Id.
it 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). American citizens alleged in federal district courr
that a French warship docked in Philadelphia belonged to them and had been unlawfily
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writing for an unanimous court, upheld an immunity claim by France
on the basis of grace and comity recognizing that most other nations
practiced the doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity.32
Marshall explained that each nation has exclusive jurisdiction within
its own territory, but that "all sovereigns impliedly engaged not to
avail themselves of a power over their equal, which a romantic confi-
dence in their magnanimity has placed in their hands." 33 Although
this opinion held only that United States courts lacked jurisdiction
over public warships of a foreign nation, Schooner Exchange has been
interpreted as granting absolute sovereign immunity to foreign
nations .34
In the first half of the twentieth-century the courts began to chip
away at the doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity. The
courts slowly adopted the principle of restrictive sovereign immunity
under which immunity was granted only for the public acts of a sov-
ereign.3 5 Disputes regarding the private act of a sovereign were ap-
propriate matters for a U.S. court's resolution.3 6  The State
Department formalized the policy in the "Tate Letter," 37 which ex-
pressly adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,38
allowing immunity for a foreign state's public acts and excluding
from immunity claims based on commercial actions. 39 In practice,
however, the courts looked to the State Department, whose case-by-
case determinations were usually based on foreign policy
considerations .4o
The FSIA, enacted in 1976, is the last link in the history of sov-
taken. The court held that a distinction must be made between a foreign state's sovereign
and private acts when determining whether or not to subject that foreign sovereign to
United States jurisdiction. Id. at 117-47.
32 Id. at 135-47. The absolute theory of sovereign immunity grants immunity to a
foreign nation in all suits brought against it. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 34 (1978).
3 ' Id. at 138.
34 Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); von Mehren,
supra note 32, at 33, 39-40 (1978).
315 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits Against Foreign
States, H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6607 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT, with pages cited to 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS].
:1( Id. This policy was consistent with the Western European countries' policy of re-
strictive sovereign immunity, under which the United States was consistently denied im-
munity. Id.
37 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE But.I. 984
(1952). According to the theory of absolute sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot be
subject to the jurisdiction of another sovereign. The restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity limits the doctrine of immunity to those actions of a sovereign that are public, but not
actions that are private. Id.
38 HOUSE REPORT, snpra note 35, at 6606.
T late, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Sovereigns.
26 D)EPr ST. Butt.. 984. 984 (1952).
40 HousE REPORT. supra note 35.
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ereign immunity. The Act was designed to codify the "restrictive"
theory of sovereign immunity.4' To ensure that courts would apply
the restrictive principle, rather than bow to State Department pres-
sure, Congress removed the executive branch from determinations
of immunity. 42 By transferring such power to the judicial branch, the
FSIA sought to relieve the State Department of any coercion from
foreign governments. 43 The legislative history of the Act supports
this theory, recognizing the need to reduce the emphasis on foreign
policy considerations and assure American litigants that immunity
decisions are based on purely legal grounds and with due process
protection. 44
The Act's grant of foreign sovereign immunity is subject to sev-
eral enumerated exceptions. 45 The immunity defense is withheld in
cases where there is a waiver of immunity46 or where a foreign nation
engages in commercial activity which has a direct impact in the
United States. 47 Further, where the issue concerns the rights to
property which is situated in or has sufficient connections to the
United States and is siezed in violation of international law, sover-
eign immunity will not be granted. 48 Finally, no immunity is pro-
vided if tort damages are sought from the foreign state49 or a suit in
admiralty is brought against the foreign state.50 A nation whose con-
duct falls within one of these exceptions is subject to the jurisdiction
of the U.S. courts.
The Immunities Act is plagued with ambiguities 51 and as such
has been the source of much litigation. 52 Although purporting to
follow precedent, courts which largely depend upon foreign rela-
tions and strict construction of the language of the FSIA are more
likely to afford foreign defendants immunity. 53 In contrast, those
courts which are devoted to assuring fair and predictable litigation
41 Id. at 6605.
42 Id. at 6606.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605 (1982).
46 Id. § 1605(a)(1).
47 Id. § 1605(a)(2). See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
48 Id. § 1605(a)(3), (4).
49 Id. § 1605(a)(5). See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
5 o Id. § 1605(b).
51 Courts have difficulty defining the terms "direct effect" and "in the United States."
Another source of confusion is categorization of a cause of action as either sovereign or
commercial.
52 See, e.g, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
DeSanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985); Texas Trading
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); Frolova v. USSR, 558 F. Supp.
358 (N.D. 11. 1983); Rio Grande Matter of Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1155
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); United Euram v. USSR, 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Yessenin-
Volpin v. Novosli Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
53 See, e.g., Gregorian, 658 1. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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with foreign defendants base their analyses on precedent and con-
gressional intent, and these courts often bar immunity. 54 Criteria for
categorizing foreign states' actions as public and thus immune from
suit in American courts were developed by the court in Victory Trans-
port, Inc. v. Comisaria General,55 a pre-FSIA landmark case. The 1976
Immunities Act differed significantly from and superceded this ap-
pellate decision, recognizing "commercial acts" which, if involved in
the action, bar sovereign immunity under most circumstances. 56
While Victory Transport considered'both the nature and purpose of the
act, the Immunities Act focused mainly on the nature of the foreign
state's action in determining whether the conduct is commercial or
public. 57
In 1976 the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Alfred Dun-
hill of London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 58 which focused on foreign states
in their commercial capacities. Dunhill involved the Cuban govern-
ment's seizure of cigar manufacturing businesses and assignment of
"interventors" to occupy the business. When importers, including
American companies, mistakenly paid the interventors for
preintervention debts, they were forced by law to pay the former
owners. 59 The importers claimed their entitlement to reimburse-
ment from the interventors. The interventors, on the other hand,
argued that the debt was quasi-contractual, with its situs in Cuba,
and therefore their refusal to pay was an act of state, not subject to
American courts.60 Distinguishing between commercial and public
acts, the Court's plurality opinion determined that the act of state
doctrine should not extend to commercial acts of sovereign states. 6 '
The Supreme Court in Dunhill recognized the importance of
-54 See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Callejo, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985);
DeSanchez, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985); Texas Trading, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir 1981); Rio
Grande, 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United Euran, 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Jessenin, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
55 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 934 (1965). Strictly political acts
are categorized as follows: "(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as naturalization; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4) acts
concerning diplomatic activity; (5) public loans." Id. at 360.
56 von Mehren, supra note 32, at 53.
57 Id. Note that I'ictoy Transport should no longer be relied upon as a determinant of
jurisdictional immunity since it preceded the FSIA. Id.
58 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Court recognized that the adoption
of the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity suggests that commercial dealings be-
tween sovereign states should be governed by established rules of international law. Id. at
704-05. Justice Stevens' concurrence, while agreeing that the case was not appropriate for
invocation of the act of state doctrine, did not join the Majority opinion's adoption of the
commercial activities exception. Id. at 715.
59 Id. at 684-86. The Cuban manufacturers, upon losing their businesses, fled to
America. Id.
(i Id. The act of state doctrine "[p]recludes the courts of this country from inquiring
into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within
its own territory." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
" Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695.
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healthy foreign relations, but concluded that this concern should not
control when a suit arises out of a foreign sovereign's commercial
dealings. After noting that foreign participation in international
trade was increasing, the Court predicted a corresponding rise in in-
jury to private businessmen. 62 The Court stressed that "subjecting
foreign governments to the rule of law in their commercial dealings
presents a much smaller risk of affronting their sovereignty than
would an attempt to pass on the legality of their governmental
acts."163 Having established that foreign states in their commercial
capacities have only the standing of private citizens, the Court de-
clared: "Subjecting them in connection with such [commercial] acts
to the same rules of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely to
touch very sharply on 'national nerves.' "64
Following this policy declaration, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York expanded on the
Supreme Court's rationale in Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency. 65
There, an American businessman brought an action against two So-
viet entities for writing allegedly defamatory articles and publishing
them in four publications which were distributed worldwide. 66 Be-
cause section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA67 specifically exempts libel from
the exceptions to immunity, the court considered subsection (a)(2)68
which bars from immunity a foreign state whose act, performed
outside the United States, is commercial and which "causes a direct
effect in the United States."' 69 The court in Yessenin found that a "di-
rect effect" had been caused in the United States by the article hav-
ing been written and published in the journals which were circulated
in the U.S. The direct effect caused in the United States was the in-
jury to plaintiff's reputation and consequently his business.70
(2 Id. at 703.
63 Id. at 703-04.
64 Id. at 704.
65 443 F.Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
6(3 Id. at 854-55. One of the four publications was Izvestia.
67 Section 1605 states in pertinent part that:
(a) a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case ....
(2) in which the action is based ...
(iii) upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and the act causes a
direct effect in the United States ....
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and
caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official
or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to ....
(1B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
Sessenin, 443 F. Supp. at 855.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)( 2 )).
70 Id. a 855. The writing and publication of the articles was done in the Soviet Union,
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The court also discussed the legislative meaning behind the cat-
egory of "commercial activity." Included in this definition is a
"broad spectrum of endeavor, from an individual commercial trans-
action or act to a regular course of commercial conduct."'7' Immu-
nity was ultimately granted to the Soviet defendants in Yessenin, as
the court determined that the foreign act must be "in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state,"' 72 and the publica-
tions were held to be "acts of intra-governmental cooperation. ' 73
Although the court in Yessenin granted immunity, the decision
implied that conduct of a foreign state, including libel arising out of
commercial actions, could be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts. The court stated that the "relevant issue in this case is not
whether [defendants] Novosti or TASS engage[d] in commercial ac-
tivities but whether their alleged libels were in 'connection with a
commercial activity.' ",74 In this case, it was held that the libel was
not associated with commercial conduct but was rather "one instance
of a cooperative arrangement with a governmental agency." 75 The
court also noted that the libel did not arise out of a contractual rela-
tionship with a foreign party. 76
Immunity was granted to the defendants not because the action
was for libel, but rather because the libel had no connection to any
commercial conduct of the sovereign state. Therefore, Yessenin,
while reaching the same result as Gregorian, stands for the opposite
proposition.
The Yessenin court's opinion was strengthened by the reasoning
in United Euram Corp. v. USSR. 77 In that case, a claim was brought
against the USSR, its Ministry of Culture, and the Soviet State Con-
cert Society for breach of contract. The defendant's motion to dis-
miss, in reliance on section 1605(a)(5)(B) of the FSIA, 78 was denied.
Though "interference with contract rights" is included in this provi-
and the widespread distribution of the articles made a direct impact in the United States.
Id.
71 Id. at 856 (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 6614). Note that the Immunities
Act does not provide that a sovereign whose conduct is commercial becomes a commercial
entity. Rather it stands for the principle that when a sovereign nation engages in commer-
cial activities, it will not be granted foreign sovereign immunity. Id. at 855.
72 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
73 Id. at 856.
74 Id.
75 Id. The court noted that this does not fall within a "regular course of commercial
conduct" or "a particular commercial transaction or act." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)).
76 Id. at 856. This is in contrast to Gregorian, where libel was alleged to arise out of the
commercial contract claim. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
77 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In United Etram, the Soviets breached their con-
tract to perform at concerts organized by plaintiff. Plaintiff was to pay a cash fee for the
service in addition to the artists' salaries and traveling expenses. The court held that this
was a private service contract. Id. at 611.
78 Id. at 612.
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sion, 79 the court declared, "[s]ubsection (a)(5) was intended to cover
noncommercial torts ... and the restrictions embodied in subsection
(a)(2). ' 8 0 Because the Gregorian court did restrict the scope of the
commercial activity exception,"' this language relates directly to the
Gregorian decision.
Other courts considering the issue of sovereign immunity have
focused on the "direct effect" language of the FSIA. In Texas Trading
v. Republic of Nigeria,8 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction existed under
the Immunities Act over claims involving the Nigerian government's
breach of contract to purchase cement and breach of letters of
credit.8 3 The court in Texas Trading held that the breach of both con-
tracts had direct effects in the United States.8 4 The court stressed
congressional intent, stating that "[c]ourts construing either term8 5
should be mindful more of Congress' concern with providing 'access
to the courts' to those aggrieved by the commercial acts of a foreign
sovereign than with cases defining 'direct' or locating effects under
state statutes passed for dissimilar purposes. ' '8 6 The court added
that Congress did not pass the FSIA to restrict jurisdiction, but
rather to regularize it. 87 Such a broad construction of the Act8 8 signi-
fies the court's interest in providing private citizens with a forum for
business grievances involving foreign states.
In an effort to assist the sovereign immunity analysis, courts con-
tinue to clarify the distinction between the private and the public
conduct of a foreign sovereign. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit further developed the "commercial activities ex-
ception" in Callejo v. Bancomer.89 Callejo arose when plaintiffs brought
action against a Mexican bank, Bancomer, for breach of contract
when, after selling plaintiffs' certificates of deposit, the bank repaid
all deposits in Mexican pesos.9 0 The court, in denying defendant's
immunity claim, focused on whether the material element of the
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Gregoian, 658 F. Supp. at 1233. The Gregorian court limited the scope of tile
commercial activity exception in order to afford foreign nations the absolute immunity
granted the U.S. government in libel actions.
82 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
83 Id. at 303-06.
84 Id. at 312; see Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam).
85 The terms referred to include "direct" and "in the United States."
8 Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 312-13 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35. at 6605).
87 Id. at 313 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 6605-06).
88 See Matter of Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Cit-
ing the court's analysis in Texas Trading, this court held that the term "regular course of
commercial conduct" should be broadly construed. Id. at 1162.
89 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
90 Id. at 1105-06. The bank acted pursuant to new Mexican exchange control regula-
tions. Id.
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complaint was a sovereign activity by the defendant. 9 ' In finding the
bank's action commercial, the court stated that Bancomer did not
"acquire any derivative immunity by virtue of the fact that, in breach-
ing the terms of the certificates of deposit, it was merely complying
with sovereign decrees of the Mexican government."
9 2
It has been well established that foreign sovereign immunity will
not be granted merely because the conduct in question was based on
the foreign government's decree. The Fifth Circuit used such rea-
soning in deciding DeSanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,93 a case
involving the Nicaraguan government's order to stop payment on a
check that the Nicaraguan Central Bank issued to plaintiff.94 The ac-
tion underlying the suit was issuance of the check to plaintiff, and the
particular grievance was nonpayment of the check. 9 5 The court
echoed the view of Callejo, stating that if the defendant's actions were
commercial, then defendant had no immunity, despite the fact that
its actions were based on a sovereign decision of the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment.9 6 The court relied on congressional intent as the basis for
its decision, reasoning that "Congress' intent in instructing us to fo-
cus on the nature of the activity rather than on its purpose was to
preclude foreign governments from always being able to claim sover-
eign immunity.' 9
7
In contrast to such suits against foreign states, libel actions
against the U.S. government are more straightforward. The Gregorian
court relied heavily on the absolute grant of immunity to the U.S.
government with respect to tort claims. As seen in Bosco v. U.S. Corps
of Engineers,9 8 the FTCA precludes action against the United States
for any claim arising out of libel. 9 Because the language is unambig-
uous, this case engendered no questions regarding the application of
the FTCA, and the United States government enjoyed sovereign
immunity. 100
The Gregorian court's grant of immunity to the Soviet defendants
is blatantly inconsistent with the above precedent, particularly with
91 Id. at 1109. The activities at the heart of the suit were the sale of the certificates of
deposit and payment to plaintiffs in Mexican pesos, both private in nature. Id.
92 Id.
93 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
94 Id. at 1386-89.
95 Id.
96 Id. The bank sold dollars to regulate Nicaragua's foreign exchange reserves. Id.
97 Id. at 1343.
98 611 F. Supp. 449 (D.C. Tex. 1985). In Bosco the United States Corps of Engineers
(Corps) turned down the low bidder on a lake embankment project because the record of
his subcontractor (Bosco) "lacked integrity." The Corps subsequently informed the press
of its decision. Claiming that this report tarnished his reputation as a businessman, Bosco
sued the Corps for libel. The libel claim was dismissed by the court pursuant to the FTCA.
Id. at 451-53.
99 Id. at 452 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)); see supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
I ooIh.
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Yessenin and United Euram. These cases stand for the proposition that
the commercial activity of a sovereign state is subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion and the commercial activities exception of the Immunities Act
should not be restricted by the scope of the noncommercial tort re-
striction. 10' Although the Yessenin court did allow the foreign defend-
ants immunity, the decision was based on the fact that the alleged
libel was not "in connection with a commercial activity." 02 Gregorian
differs in that the libel action did appear to arise out of a commercial
contract action against the Soviet defendants. 0 3 Rather than address
this point, the Gregorian court abandoned the commercial versus pub-
lic acts issue and embraced a policy argument. 10 4 The United Euram
court specifically stated that the restrictions on noncommercial torts
were "not intended to restrict the scope of the commercial activity
exception."' 0 5 The Gregorian court, after referring to this case, ad-
mitted that the court should apply the same analysis to the libel claim
as to the commercial contract claim.' 0 6
Rather than use the decisions in Yessenin and United Euran as
bases for its decision, the Gregorian court ignored such analysis and
hinged its argument on a congressional intent perspective. The court
stated that since the FTCA allows the United States government im-
munity in noncommercial tort actions, it is unlikely that Congress
would have wished to expose foreign states to suit for the same ac-
tion.10 7 This argument, based on diplomatic considerations and al-
leged congressional intent, in no way distinguishes Gregorian from
Yessenin or United Euram, but simply disregards the law as interpreted
in those two cases.
By focusing only on what the court perceived to be the legisla-
ture's intent, this decision evades several points. First, it is well docu-
mented that Congress, in passing the FSIA, was interested in giving
American citizens a domestic forum for international disputes.",, In
Texas Trading the court stressed that the purpose of the FSIA was to
restrict immunity to actions arising from a foreign state's public
acts.' 09 The court further emphasized the importance of providing
American litigants "access to the courts."' 10 By declining to discuss
this important point, the Gregorian court denies American litigants
") United Euram, 461 F. Supp. at 612; l'essenin, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Both
courts favored broad construction of the term "commercial activity."
102 Yessenin, 443 F.Supp. at 856.
"03 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
104 See Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1233-34.
105 United Euram, 461 F. Supp. at 612.
1o(I Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1231.
107 Id. at 1233.
108 647 F.2d at 312-13; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 6605.
1o' Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308.
1o Id. at 312.
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"access to the courts" in contravention of expressed congressional
intent.
Also, as noted by the Gregorian court, the result of this decision
could encourage foreign states to make commercial disputes more
serious impediments to foreign relations, simply to avoid being
haled into U.S. courts.1 I' This result could undermine the holdings
in Callejo and DeSanchez, which state that merely because a commer-
cial action is based on a sovereign decision of a foreign state, that
does not afford the foreign state immunity."12 Such a bold proposi-
tion can be eluded when courts like the Gregorian court recognize
precedent but decline to follow it in order to avoid sensitive foreign
policy matters. The risk of foreign states taking advantage of such a
position is inevitable.
Finally, predictability of immunity determinations is lost when
each court can grant immunity based purely on public policy and its
interpretation of legislative intent. The Texas Trading court held that
Congress did not intend the FSIA to restrict jurisdiction, but rather
to regularize it. 113 It further held that "[n]o rigid parsing of [section]
1605 should lose sight of that purpose."' '14 Rather than discuss this
documented legislative intent, the Gregorian court analyzed the issue
in terms of its belief regarding Congress' purpose in enacting the
FSIA. The language of the FSIA," 1 5 along with the exceptions to the
exceptions,' 16 make the statute unclear in its own right. By imposing
its analysis, the Gregorian court has rendered the Immunities Act even
more ambiguous.
The preceding points illustrate that the "legislative intent" upon
which the court relied distorts the function of the FSIA and further
complicates the task of predicting under what circumstances a for-
eign state can invoke immunity. The Gregorian court's decision could
lead to the erosion of the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Although the court never determined that the Soviet defendants
acted in a sovereign capacity, it compared such defendants to the
U.S. government in its public capacity. If defendants' libelous actions
were not based on commercial activity, then the Gregorian court could
have followed the reasoning of the Yessenin and United Euram courts
without causing such confusion. If, however, the defendants' actions
were commercial, they acted in the capacity of a private party' 17 and
Gregorian, 658 F. Supp. at 1231.
12 See Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1162; DeSanchez, 770 F.2d at 1391.
I i: Texas 7rading, 647 F.2d at 313 (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 6605-06).
I 1.1 1(1.
115 See supra note 5 1.
I i( See supra note 67. The United Euram court held that although noncommercial torts
(including libel) were exceptions to sovereign immunity, the noncommercial restrictions
did not limit the scope of the commercial activity exception. Id.
1 17 Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704.
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pursuant to the FSIA and should not be held to the same standards
as the United States government.
According to established precedent,'18 the court, in determin-
ing whether immunity exists under the FSIA, should initially decide
whether the nature of the defendant's activity is commercial or sov-
ereign. Only then can the court determine whether or not the for-
eign state should be subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Gregorian court
discussed the status of the defendants in light of Yesssenin and United
Euram and without drawing any logical conclusions, or making any
significant distinctions, made a determination based on completely
different rationale. The court's reasoning is incomplete and leaves
room for a myriad of interpretations.
How then should a court deal with the doctrine of foreign sover-
eign immunity? First, courts should rely on documented legislative
intent and legal precedent unless other factors are clearly relevant.
Second, courts should follow Congress' lead and broadly construe
the term "commercial activity," as did the courts in Yessenin, United
Euram, Callejo, and DeSanchez, thereby providing American litigants
with more predictable access to the courts.' 19 One commentator has
argued that if policy considerations in particular circumstances de-
mand imposition of immunity, the State Department should be re-
quired to compensate plaintiffs who are unjustly defeated. 120 Such a
policy might deter the State Department from advocating immunity
when it is not clearly required and this in turn would take pressure
off the courts. 121 Few would support this measure, however, as appli-
cation of such a policy would inevitably become too subjective.
In conclusion, it appears that the District Court erred when it
granted the Soviet defendants immunity. Although it is necessary to
prevent judicial intrusion upon another nation's power, Congress
codified the FSIA to restrict the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
public actions.12 2 The Gregorian court ultimately gave this little
weight in its analysis of the immunity issue. Rather than follow prior
development of the law, the court stretched legislative intent to an
extreme, yielding an objectionable result. The Gregorian court suc-
ceeded in taking from private citizens a predictable domestic forum
for international disputes, Congress' goal in enacting the FSIA. By
focusing on the nature of the conduct in determining subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign states, rather than bowing to diplomatic
l See supra note 54.
I Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 315; see Atkeson, H.R. 11315: The Revised State Justice Bill
on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70 AM. J. INT'L L., 298, 311 (1976).
120 Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Initnnnies Act of 1976: Its Origin- Meaning and Ffect, 3
YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 47 (1976).
121 Id.
122 von Mehren, supra note 32, at 33.
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pressure, future courts could further the goal of justice and predict-
ability desired under the FSIA.
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